
In its quest to expand beyond north-east Nigeria, clashes between the JAS and ISWAP factions are not in the global terror group’s interests.
The JAS faction of Boko Haram, also known as Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, began significant offensives against the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the group’s second faction, in October 2023. According to continuing research conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), this resulted in the ISWAP forces having to vacate many of their island territories in the Lake Chad area.
After suffering multiple setbacks over the previous three years, losing ground, and experiencing a large-scale fighter exodus following the death of its leader Abubakar Shekau, JAS ought to have been in the rear. Rather, the gang took control of portions of ISWAP’s long-held territory and set upon it. According to those with knowledge of the fighting, JAS currently controls up to 40% of the islands that ISWAP formerly held. However, ISWAP still has authority over the
JAS’ gains are linked to a crucial alliance with an influential former ISWAP commander, Mikhail Usman, AKA Kaila. Kaila, from the Buduma ethnic group, defected to JAS in early 2023 with some commanders and fighters. Among their grievances was the perceived marginalisation of the Buduma from ISWAP leadership positions
After Boko Haram split into two factions in 2016, Islamic State recognised ISWAP as an affiliate under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Since then, JAS has had some success against ISWAP. In August 2021, an ISWAP attack on a JAS base on the Barwa islands in Niger failed after 12 of the former group’s 20 vehicles were destroyed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). JAS retaliated five days later, wounding al-Barnawi in the ensuing battle. Around 25 November 2021, JAS attacked another ISWAP location at Shuwaram, killing about 180 fighters – ISWAP’s biggest casualty. JAS’ capture of key ISWAP territories is arguably its most important success against its rival in recent years. Former fighters with knowledge of the dynamics within and between the groups told the
During the same time period, JNIM also produced more insecurity than ISWAP. Islamic State claims that in January and February, ISWAP carried out 96 strikes that left 205 people dead. Despite February having fewer attacks than January, 41% of the assaults involved the use of IEDs, which resulted in a higher casualty rate.
Counterterrorism should benefit from the proxy war between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in the Sahel and West Africa, which has been demonstrated by the conflicts between their affiliates, ISGS and JNIM, as well as the competition between ISWAP and JAS in the Lake Chad Basin. These violent extremist groups are more likely to be exhausted the more they battle with one another.
The Multinational Joint Task Force and national armies continue their military operations in the Lake Chad Basin in an effort to
What this means for governments is that they shouldn’t rely on these groups to self-implode. Instead, they should ramp up military pressure to complement the damage the groups inflict on each other
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